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This ~rticlc p~esents the ~hcorctica.l foundations for an ()ngoin~ resc:lrl~hproJect on elites and theIr perceptIons of poverty and poor people within
their own societies. We arc addressing this topic for t,\\'o reasons. First, vir-
tually nothing is known about such perceptions in nlOS( so,ictics, cspl-ci,llly
in less developed countries where poverty is nlost serious and where our
work is mainly focused. Second, the \vay in which clites pen:eivc and define
poverty can powerfully affect social policy and the quality of life of the poor.
The Context of the Proiect
The very broad connotations of the concepts 'perceptions' and 'pOVl~rty'
allow them to be adapted to the wide array of circun1stanccs that prevail in
the very diverse societies that arc to be studied in this comparative projcl:t.
For the sake of analytic coherence, a more precisely defined concept is intro-
duced: 'social consciousness'. This term refers to a set of perceptions which
de Swaan (1988), in his study of the evolution of social policy in Western
Europe and the USA, found to be relevant to analyse th{~ ways poverty
affected the elites and to interpret their efforts to control it.
Members of the elites possess social consciousness to the degree that:
1. they are aware of the interdependence among social groups in society -
and, most relevantly, of the external effects of poverty upon the clites,
which they may perceive either as threatening or as promising oppor-
tunities;
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2. they realize that as members of the elite they bear some responsibility for
the condition of the poor; and
3. they believe that feasible and efficacious means of improving the lot of
the poor exist or might be created.
James Manor (1994) has applied the concept of social consciousness in a study
of clites and their incapacities in coping with a mass poisoning of slum
dwellers by illicit liquor in India. He argued that the clites had gone some of
the way towards each of the three clements in de Swaan's definition. For
example, they often believed that poor people posed threats to them - by way
of epidemics, crime, possible insurrection and so forth. That idea can trigger
a realization that all social groups arc interlinked, and the conviction that it
is in the interests of clites to alleviate at least the extremes of poverty. In coun-
tries that arc experiencing economic growth, the availability of surpluses and
the rising morale that attends growth sometimes inspire the beginnings of a
belief that both the resources and the instruments (governmental or non-
governmental) to tackle poverty exist or may be created.
When, as is often the case, individual members of the elite are unable on
their own to ward off the threats, or to exploit the opportunities that the pres-
ence of the poor holds for them, and since they are incapable of alleviating
poverty individually, the presence of the poor in their midst confronts the
clites with a problem of collective action: to coordinate their efforts, either
through voluntary agreement or by seeking a compulsory arrangement,
namely public action. In the history of western welfare states, elite initiatives
and elite consent have been pivotal in bringing about (and equally in holding
off) collective and public arrangements for remedying ignorance, disease and
deprivation.
The three elements of a 'social consciousness' refer to three different
types of thinking by elites. Point 1 entails a factual assessment of the con-
dition of the society in which they live. It calls for a 'proto-sociological'
insight on the part of elite members. Point 2 entails both factual assessments
(the identification of a causal chain linking their (in)action to the living con-
ditions of the poor) and moral evaluations, which researchers need to sort
out. Point 3 requires them to accept the power of collective or public agency
(govcrnlnental or non-governmental) to change the prevailing situation.
It ought to be said at the outset that altruistic dispositions and a general
elinlate of social compassion greatly facilitate collective and public action to
alleviate poverty (see Bendix, 1962: 286-90). But the problem of coordi-
nation, that is the distribution of burdens within the elites, must somehow
be resolved if remedial arrangements are to be realized. This requires that the
1utual suspicions of inaction or desertion, in short the fear of 'free riders'
with its paralysing impact, are overcome. If this occurs, it is most often in the
course of tentative, yet successful collective efforts that strengthen mutual
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confidence. To the degree that elites possess a social consciousness, in ~111 three
respects listed above, and if that awareness resonates \vith pCfson..tl and
societal mora] concerns, it should facilitate voluntar~r and public action to
tackle poverty.
At the cognitive level, elites may not be fully aware of SOCi~ll intcrdl'pen-
dence. They may not regard the poor either as a threat (through contagion,
crime, revolt, immigration and so forth) or as a source of opportunity (~lS
potential consumers, recruits, nlcnials, voters and so on). When the) perceive
social interdependencies, they nlay yet doubt or deny that feasible and
efficacious means can be found to reduce or alleviate poverty. And finally,
even if they recognize the external effects that poverty exerts on them and
believe that effective rcnledies are feasible, they may still be morally indif-
ferent to the lot of the poor, or [0 the efforts ol thej~ peers to alleviate it.
In other words, it is possible that we shall encounter anlong the elites
three basic attitudes to poverty and poor people. First, they may be wholly
indifferent to the problems of the poor. Second, they nlay be concerned with
the problems of the poor because they perceive that these pose threats to their
own well-being, and because they believe that the poor might providt' thCl
with opportunities, individually and collectively. Yet, they nlay still rcn'~ljn
inactive and resign themselves to the existing state of affairs, because they
believe that no effective remedies are available. And, third, their concern and
confidence in the efficacy of their actions may impel thenl to undertake re-
medial, collective action.
Of course, elites are not monolithic, and will tend to be divided in their
perceptions of the poor in all relevant aspects. In the course of tinlet the
nature of the debate and thus of perceptions may change: for instance, the
idea that the poor are responsible for their fate was off the agenda in F:uropc
for a long period, but was brought firmly on to it in the 1980s. Since then, a
paradigmatic split in European elite perceptions has occurred, and similar
divisions may be found in our studies of other societies.
At this stage the research project includes field studies in Brazil, Mozam-
bique, South Africa, Bangladesh, the Philippines and two regions of India.
The choice of research areas was, as usual, limited by the availability of funds,
but within these constraints countries were selected that differ in the degree
of poverty and the degree of inequality that prevails there: extreme inequal-
ity and considerable poverty (South Africa, Brazil); considerable inequality
and extreme poverty (Bangladesh, the two regions in India); considerable
inequality and considerable poverty (Philippines). We expect that both the
sheer size of the 'social question' (the degree of poverty) and the 'social dis-
tance' between the elites and the poor (the degree of inequality) will turn out
to be major factors in shaping elite perceptions.
We make extensive usc in this article of three terms: 'clites', 'the poor- and
the 'non-poor'. We offer brief explanations of these (admittedly somewhat
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imprecise) terms presently, and we elaborate on them throughout this article.
But it is worth stressing here that we use them because they are sufficiently
flexible to analyse the diverse societies and the wide array of institutional
arrangements that we are studying. The terms arc, moreover, compatible with
various approaches to analysis in terms of 'class'. In some societies, class rela-
tions have developed greater coherence and salience than in others. The power
resources, the material wealth and cultural capital of the elites on the one hand
and of the poor on the other hand vary considerably from one country to
another and so do the functional interdependencies between elites and the
poor strata. Perceptions of inequality and of the necessity to aJleviate poverty
also loom larger in the popular awareness and public discourse of some coun-
tries than of others.
Let us now look briefly at these three terms. 'Elites', by definition,
control a much larger share of material, symbolic and political resources than
the other strata of society. They occupy the highest ranks in a hierarchy of
status and authority, be it achieved or ascribed. Yet, the nation's elites do not
constitute a homogeneous group. They should be seen as an interlinking set
of groups with differing but often overlapping spheres of influence. The
sphere of influence reflects the immediate interests of a particular elite. But
its capacity to exercise power in other spheres is often substantial, and some
clites arc able to exercise power in all spheres.
There is no clear dividing line that demarcates elites from the rest of
society, although in some societies they are more sharply separated from
other citizens than elsewhere. The elites are made up of those persons who
occupy the strongest power positions, control the most property and hold
the highest prestige. As a rule of thumb, individuals (and people closely
related to them) who belong to the uppermost one-tenth of 1 percent on at
least two out of these three dimensions constitute the elites.
The 'poor', on the other hand, possess very few material, political or
symbolic resources; they rank at the bottom of the status or authority hier-
archy. Their material deprivation is reinforced by their low status and by their
exclusion from cultural and political resources, and vice versa. They lack the
skills. capital and connections which the clites possess in relative abundance.
If they resort to the limited means for violent coercion at their disposal, they
arc denied social legitimation as 'criminals' and 'rebels', whereas violence
against them is often justified as 'legitimate self-defence' and the 'restoration
of law and ordcr~.
The label 'non-poor' is applied here to all groups other than the pOOf,
including clites. But in most societies, the vast majority of the 'non-poor'
stand outside the elites. They possess some of the resources, status and
authority which elites enjoy - but in most cases, only limited amounts of
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Relations between the Poor and the Elites
Researchers have studied the poor as individuals, as f.lnll1ies and hllUSl"holds,
as members of poor communities, neighbourhoods and regions__ as products
of larger poverty-creating structures. They have been analysed as victims and
perpetrators of crime, as nlcnlbers of minority cultures" as passive conSUll1ers
of mass culture and active producers of a 'counterculture', as p~lrticip,lnts in
the informal economy, as inventors of survival strategies, as an ccononlic.
burden and as a reserve army of labour - to nlcntion just sonlC of the preoc-
cupations of poverty research (see 0yen et al., 1996).
However, in some of the literature, the poor and poverty arc tre~lt(l>d as
phenomena which can be understood in isolation frolu the rest of societv. The
poor are sometimes treated as a group living, be it unconlfort~lbly, ~t one
remove from society at large. We intend to study poverty as a phCn0l11CnOn
intimately bound up with the elites who tend to dominate the widt.lor socit.,ty.
Elite perceptions of poverty and poor people have received grossly inade-
quate attention. A comprehensive review of the literature on poverty in It.-"ss
developed countries by two leading authorities yielded nothing on this topic
(Lipton and RavaHion, 1995), consultation of several colleagues, knowlc..'dgc-
able in different relevant fields confirmed the existence of this hiatus that the
present research project should be able to remedy at least in part.
The elites, who occupy the small upper stratun1 within the category of
the non-poor, and their functions in the emergence and reproduction of
poverty are as interesting and important an object for poverty research as .lrc
the poor themselves. The elites have images of the poor and of poverty which
shape their decisions and actions. So far, little is known about those inli\gcs,
except as they arc sketchily ponrayed in popular stereotypes. The clites Inay
well ignore or deny the external effects of their own actions (and onlissions)
upon the living conditions of the poor. Many social scientists may take a very
different view. As poverty emerged and was reproduced, legal frameworks
were created to contain the problems it caused with profound, and largely
unknown, consequences for the poor themselves. In general, political, edu-
cational and social institutions tend to ignore or even damage the interests of
the poor. In constructing a physical infrastructure for transport, industry,
trade and tourism, the settlements of the poor are often the first to be razed
or to be left standing and exposed to pollution, noise and crowding.
Although elites (and most of the other non-poor with them) may per-
ceive the poor as a burden on society, poverty researchers have pointed out
that a certain degree of poverty helps to smooth labour relations~ by secur-
ing a labour reserve, keeping a downward pressure on wages and disciplin-
ing those who hold jobs (e.g. Piven and Cloward, 1972).
Herbert Gans (1973,1995) has demonstrated how functional the negative
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identification of the poor may be for the wider society. Most important are
the economic functions of poverty, as for lack of other options the poor arc
~orccd to perform activities considered degrading or unclean, and thus allow-
Ing the non-poor to shun them. The poor are more likely to buy second-hand
goods and leftover foodstuffs, thus prolonging their economic utility. They
are prone to use the services of low-quality doctors, teachers and lawyers
whom the non-poor shy away from, thereby enhancing their professional
opportunities. Poverty and the poor serve an important symbolic function, in
reminding citizens of the lot that may befall those who do not heed the values
of thrift, diligence and cleanliness, and of the constant threat that the rough,
the immoral and the violent represent for the rest of society.
Physically, the poor and the non-poor are often kept apart, through
differential land use and ghettoization. Socially, they are separated through
differential participation in the labour market, the consumption economy,
and in political, social and cultural institutions. Conceptually, they are
divided through stereotyping and media cliches. This separation is even more
pronounced between the clites and the poor.
The views of Gans and others from a long tradition of poverty research
serve as a 'sensitizing background) for the evaluation of the perceptions that
elite respondents report: when the contrast with the perceptions of the inter-
viewees becomes especially stark, or when we find the respondents to be
remarkably reticent or denying, further responses may be elicited by cau-
tiously introducing these notions from social science.
The Role of Elites
It is possible to identify macro-economic and macro-social processes which
create, sustain or, on the contrary, alleviate poverty. Elites do much to shape
such developments, sometimes in a planned and coordinated way. But
members of the elites also act on their own, deliberately or spontaneously.
How committed arc individual members of the elites in influencing the living
conditions of the poor? I-Iow do they operate? When and to what degree do
they rely on individual, voluntary interventions, and in which cases will they
resort to collective action? In the latter case, how do they evaluate the chances
that other elite members will support the undertaking, or rather profit from
it without contributing? Under which conditions will they accept external
compulsion to coordinate their actions? What is the role they assign to state
intervention in controlling the poor and managing the external effects of
poverty? What arc the mechanisms by which elites actually impinge on the
world of the poor? The answers to these questions are bound to vary in
different societies.
There is a substantial literature on elite views of many subjects in the
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industrialized countries. There are ,vorks on the evolution of c.-lite ~lttitudes
towards the v.'elfare state in the West (Gouda, 1995; H~lgen~l~\rS" 1986: Vt~rb"l
and Orren. 1985), on the tendency of western elites to nlisunderstand Inass
pr~ferences (Chowdry and Ne,,-'comb, 1965~ Erikson and Luttbeg" t973;
Miller, 1970; Putnam, 1976)" and on the ways in \vhich n1ass opinion in the
USA is influenced by elite views (Bottomore, 1993; Putnam et al 1993
Shapiro, t992; Wittkopf, 1990~ Zaller, 1987, 1992). Tht-re is J pc.lrtirutlrlv
impressive study by Verba and Kellnlan (1987) of l~litlios and thlio idli o~\l~f
inequality in Sweden, Japan and the USA.
The general impression to emerge fron1 these sources is that n~\tion~ll
elites have played a decisive role in the developm{iont of the Western Euro-
pean welfare states. Activist political regimes, supported by civil servants, ilnd
either by progressive entrepreneurs or moderate trade union leaders, or hv
botht have succeeded in enacting major social legislation, nlu~h aided by th°
support of religious clites, whenever it was forthcoming. Aristocratic elites
and small entrepreneurs or peasants on the whole have tended to nppOSl- state
social insurance and prefer private savings (de Swaan, 1988).
The elites in many contemporary industrializing countries appear to pl'r-
ceive the poor differently than did most of the Western European countries
around the turn of the last century, when they defined and debated 'the soci.ll
question' (see Reis, 1998; Rcis and Cheibub, 1995). "fhis difference in per-
ceptions may be a crucial factor in determining the course of soci'll pulicy-
making in these countries.
The near-total lack of evidence on elite perceptions of pOVl-rty in less
developed countries is a matter of serious concern, since clites (her,- tend to
dominate the institutions that might tackle poverty. Little is also known
about the composition of those elites, the conditions in which they live,
especially their contacts and relationships with poorer groups. We propose
to examine these topics.
Poverty reduction measures can only be implemented if they arc based
on a certain legitimacy. We therefore also examine the role of clites in setting
standards, providing ideological arguments and proposing solutions.
Although elites in a particular society have much in common, they have
different bases for their power and different sets of interests. Their economic
bases - the control of land, industry, financial institutions and so forth - vary.
So do the political resources that they command - as leaders of parties, move-
ments, bureaucratic agencies, armies, unions and so on. So do their symbolic
resources-as traditional leaders, religious leaders, intellectuals or controllers
of media. So does their influence over the means of violence and coercion -
resources which are available to politicians, the police and the armed forces,
but not to other elite groups, The nature and potential impact of the networks
of connections which different elite groups maintain also vary in their char-
acter and importance.
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()n the one hand, they share certain common interests and habits of
mind. They interact, they have certain common norms, they consume along
the same patterns, they claim attention and respect because they belong to
higher social classes, and they behave in ccnain ways because they are in pos-
itions of power. On the other hand, they also oversee and possess divergent
interests, and in certain areas they arc also competitors. Actual contact with
the world of poor people is another variable that needs to be explored.
Various clites will differ in their familiarity with the everyday existence of
poor people, military and religious leaders may be better acquainted with the
poor than bankers. These different elite positions may affect their ways of
perceiving the poor, and they must shape their ideas about which kinds of
action arc desirable in controlling the external effects of poverty. This leads
us to focus on the degree or intensity of contact which elites have or have not
had with poor people and poverty.
Other social divisions separate elites and the poor and may influence per-
ceptions. Various ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural or regional differences
may be salient at any moment, and some arc partly the result of elite manipu-
The rural-urban divide is another variable to be taken into consideration.
Eugcn Weber (1976: 6-12) writes that in 19th-century France, there were
'two distinct races, city dwellers and countryfolk, living in mutual ignorance,
and in two distinct Frances, different and hostile, that of the country and that
of the town', and what has sometimes been taken as evidence of class war in
the countryside was often the extension of an understandable feud between
country and town'. In Disraeli's Britain, by contrast, the rich-poor divide
predominated over regional differences. This reminds us that perceptions can
be linked to and compounded by severe regional disparities which may dis-
tract clites from the rich-poor divide.
Like all other groups, elites have their own internal hierarchical struc-
tures. How does that affect their perceptions? Can we expect different images
in the upper reaches of an elite, as compared to the second or third layer
within it? This is quite possible, since upward mobility appears to be attended
by a change in values and social networks, and the adoption of the values
which prevail in the social category which a person is aiming at.
The Problem of Elite Action (or Inaction) against Poverty
We need to consider the degree and character of interdependence between the
poor and the less impoverished strata of society. Poverty affects privileged
groups directly and indirectly, thereby shaping their perceptions and
attempts at poverty alleviation. Throughout modern history, this has
occurred in many ways, through contagion, rebellion, crime or migration.
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Elites may attempt to allt.-'viate poverty in order to benefit thenlsclves - so as
to improve the quality of the labour force and the nl0rale of the fighting
forces, by cultivating the loyahy of poor voters, or b~' incrc~\sing aggregate
consumer demand. Other members of elites may act for nlore altruistic
reasons.
But whatever their motives, since poverty reduction requires ('ollcctivc
action, efforts to tackle poverty by some members of elites may benefit thost
among their peers who do not share their perceptions ~lnd \vho thus do not
cooperate. Theories of collective action suggest th'lt the suspicion th~\t others
will not coopcrate may be enough to discourage efforts to conlb~lt pov('rt~r.
On the other hand, collective action may bt"' triggered by outside initi,uivt.\
or through illusions and false expectations. ()nce collective .lction gets under
way., a sense of collectivity may arise in the very course of collective action,
as participants begin to assess the contributions of each other, apply sh~\r~d
norms to one another, apply informal social sanctions to laggards and defec-
tors, and equally praise and reward the most dedicated.
In the West, anti-poverty policies increased over tisTIe in scope, covering
ever more adversities and deficiencies - they often had their origins at the
dawn of modernity in charitable relief on the local level and in the 1l1odcrn
era acquired a regional range as large cities founded poor houses for the entire
area. Late in the 19th century the first social laws were enacted for the entire
nation and in the 20th century the state instituted an extending array of con1-
pulsory arrangements of national scope that should remedy the effects of
poverty.
This pattern may not repeat itself in countries which have not yet devel-
oped industrially, or which are still developing complex industrial economics
at a later stage - in the face of intense competition from advanced western
and emerging or already advanced Asian economies. But even under con-
ditions of strong international competition, clites must find ways to control
the unwelcome effects of poverty which damage their interests. The relative
weakening of the nation-state vis-a-vis transnational corporations and inter-
national financial agencies may further complicate the attempt to mobilize
the state apparatus in the efforts to manage the consequcnccs of poverty.
Assessing Elite Perceptions of the Poor
One underlying assumption in this project is that the perceptions which
people form of other persons will affect their behaviour towards them. These
perceptions may appear morally inadequate, logically inconsistent or factually
unrealistic to the outside observer, and in this case especially to specialists in
poverty research. Thus, images of the poor are often stereotyped or even
ritualized (as in some religions where poverty may be seen as a punishment or
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as a path to a better life after death). However, they are still very well amen-
able to scientific analysis and may serve to explain the behaviour of the people
who hold these perceptions and act upon them.
We need not assume that elite perceptions of the poor form a consistent
whole, they may very well reveal internal contradictions which in turn may
point to particularly contested areas in the perceived relation between th"c
clites and the poor, for instance that poor people are especially incompetent
and that the poor bear the moral responsibility for their own condition. We
have, however, assumed that elite perceptions will reveal a more or less stable
pattern over time and form a coherent (if not always consistent) whole. Where
such perceptions tUfn out to be very fragmented and volatile, this finding
would require specific explanation. We do not approach elite perceptions with
a blank mind, but use generally accepted social science ideas on poverty (as
they apply to developing societies) to alert the interviewer to particular dis-
crepancies that might merit further exploration. For example, if statistics point
to widespread deprivation and respondents deny the existence of poverty in
their society, this would not be accepted at face value but would prompt cau-
tious further questioning so as to differentiate ignorance of the facts from their
denial to a strange interviewer, or from their internal denial or repression.
On the emotional side, how do members of the elites react when con-
fronted with the often appalling conditions of life which the poor have to
endure? How do they legitimate their own lives of affluence? How do they
react to religious commands (if any) to empathize with or become like the
poor? How do those members of the elites who express extremely negative
attitudes towards the poor live with this antagonism of theirs, and how do
they legitimize it to themselves? Or has this become a non-issue - and if so,
do they not know about it, have they allowed themselves to forget; are they
actively warding off unpleasant facts? Does an emphasis on individual fail-
ures as causes of poverty function to free elites from a sense of responsibility
and guilt? How effective are such 'defence mechanisms' in maintaining cog-
nitive, emotional and moral distance from the surrounding realities of
poverty Uacoby, 1975)?
In the last analysis, we assess the degree to which elite perceptions of the
poor constitute some form of 'social consciousness'. We are well aware that
a~ain factual assessments, moral evaluations and considerations of individual
and group interests arc inseparably blended in this concept. This certainly
reflects real life, but at the same time the different aspects need to be analysed
in their own terms and in the way they tend to reinforce or contradict one
another. Thus, some moral arguments or factual assumptions may well be
'self-serving) and protect the interests of the beholder, other notions may
create considerable conflict, such as the idea that the problem of poverty is
wholly irresolvable or that the rich have a moral obligation to improve the
lot of the poor.
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Fin~lly, ~te wish to assess whether menlbers of thl~ elite .ire willing to
eng~ge In action and ""hat options they sec. Ho\v do they rc:~..lrd nlt.\~\Sun:s
~galnst poverty in relation to their own interests? Ho\\' do they place pOVl'rty
In the broader context of social development, including tht" functioning of
democracy (\\"hich in many countries in fact excludes the poor) and ho\v do
they see the future of their o\vn comnlunity if the poor continue to bt
excluded?
To sum up, the basic "'orking hypotheses are:
• Loss avoidance: the more acutely the elites perceive the poor as a thre.\t~
the more ready they will be to consider an inlpro\'cmcnt of the lift." con-
ditions of the poor.
• Gain seeking: the more opportunities the elites perceive in the pn.."SCl
of the poor, the more ready the elites will be to consider an inlprovl'nH.\llt
in the life conditions of the poor.
• Inaction: the fewer consequences the presence of the poor are p{'rl.~CiVl\
to have for the elites and their station in life, the less the elites will bl'
ready to consider an improvement of the life conditions of the poor,
• Efficacy: the more feasible the clites consider an improvcrncnt of the lift
conditions of the poor, the more willing the clites will b(~ to (H1Sid{~r
reform measures towards that end.
• Collective action: the morc the clites perceive that a fair distribution of
burdens will be realized, the more they will be willing to consider r{\fOrnl
measures.
• Deo'sive action: the more the clites arc willing to considcr inlproVl'nll\l1t
in the life conditions of the poor, the more likely it is that actual rcfornls
will be implemented.
The concept of social consciousness is opcrationali7.cd through the following
set of questions:
• Identification: how different from themselves do the clites cOl1sidt'T the
poor to be, and in which areas, if any, do the elites identify with the poor?
• Interdependence: how threatening (or how promising) with respect to
their own position do the elites consider the poor to be?
• Generalized responsibility: do the elites believe that something ought to
be done to improve the position of the poor?
• Feasibility: how far do the clites consider that the conditions of the poor
can be improved?
• Poli')' action: if the elites believe the conditions of the poor can he
improved, in what ways do they believe it ca~ be don~?
• Collective action: how do the clites sec effective coordlnatlon with their
peers can be ensured, or how do they see that non-collaboration by some
of their peers can be prevented?
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The methods used in the project are comparative, historical and sociological.
Three forms of data collection are employed. The first set of data emerges
from an analysis of the debate on poverty, as portrayed in two or more major
national newspapers during the period 1945-96. An inventorv and content
analysis will be made of editorials and articles pertaining to th~ excluded, the
indigenous poor and poor people in other countries, drawn from a random
sample of articles. These newspapers should be widely read in elite circles.
Such an analysis is an instrument for reconstructing the public discourse on
poverty diachronically, and for making comparisons across national bound-
aries in the countries being studied.
The second and most crucial set of data is drawn from open-ended inter-
views structured around predetermined topics with five to tcn persons in each
of 11 elite groups in every country under study. The interviews have the char-
acter of conversations, and should allow the reconstruction of some of the
perceptions and personal motivations behind the positions displayed in
public. It is well known that it is difficult to gain access to and to conduct
candid interviews with elite representatives. However, this task is facilitated
by the 'interactive interviewing technique' which was applied successfully by
one of the authors in the study of the Australian elite (0ycn, 1994). This
approach solicited genuine answers on sensitive issues and generated a wealth
of information.
A third set of data is drawn from observations of interaction and non-
interaction between poor people and non-poor people, especially members
of the elites, in business districts, shopping areas and thoroughfares. Such
data yield an overall impression of the diverse ways in which visible poverty
is dealt with. Where there is little contact between the poor and the non-poor,
the poor only become visible to the elites in restricted settings and in limited
ways; it is upon those that we focus our observations.
We believe that this research can fill a serious and heretofore unnoticed
gap in the literature on poverty, especially in less developed countries. The
study of elite perceptions of the poor will enrich our undcrstand~~g of the
social construction and reproduction of poverty and may facIlItate the
development of more effective efforts to tackle it.
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Abstract/ Resume/ Resu men^
^
Elite Perceptions of the Poor: ReRections for a Comparative
Research Proiect
Little is known about the ways in which the llllites pcrt"l"ive thl' poor, ('spl"ci-
ally in those societies where poverty is nlost prl'valcnt.' The poor an: dc.."pt"n-
dent on the elites, but the elites arc also ~lffcctcd by the poor: their preSCl1t
creates negative external effects in the lives of the clites (thn..lIats such as crime,
contagion, pollution, vagrancy and rebellion) but they also represent oppor-
tunities for the established strata (as potential workers, soldiers and, 1110re
recently, as consumers and voters). Members of the clites cannot ward off
these threats, or realize the opportunities on their own: that requires collc.."c-
tive action on their part. Thus, an awareness of these interdependencies ~lt
a sense of responsibility among the clites, a social consciousness', may W{,11
be a necessary condition for intervention to reduce poverty. This article pn.."-
sents the theoretical and methodological reflections undcrlyin~ a COlllpara-
tive research project into elite perceptions of poverty.
Perception des pauvres dons I'elite: reAexions pour un proiet
d'etude comparative
II existe peu d'informations sur les f ac;ons dont les clites pcr<;oivcnt Jcs
pauvres, notamment dans les socictes OU la pauvrcte cst particulicrcnlcnt
repandue. Les pauvres dependent des elites, mais lcs affcctcnt en retour. C:ar
les pauvres ont, de par leur existence, des repercussions extcrncs negatives sur
la vie des elites (menaces, comme Ie crime, la contagion, la pollution, lcs sans-
abri et fa revolte); cependant, ils constituent aussi un reservoir d\)pportunitcs
pour la couche societale etablie (par leur potcnticl commc travaillcurs, soldats
et, plus recemment, comme consommatcurs et clcctcurs). l~cs mcmbrcs des
elites ne peuvent repOllsser les menaces ni tirer parti des opportunitcs tous
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seuls; il faut de leur part une action collective. Pour une intervention en vue
de reduire la pauvrete, il est done fon possible qu'il faille d'abord une con-
science des interdependances signalees plus haut, ainsi qu'un sens de la
responsabilite au sein des elites: une conscience sociale. Le present article
soumet les reflexions theoriques et methodologiques qui sous-tendent un
projet de recherche comparative sur 1a perception qu'ont les elites de la
pauvrete.
Percepciones de las elites sobre 10 pobreza
EI articulo presenta el marco teorico de un proyecto de investigaci6n com-
parativa que se lIeva a cabo en distintos paises acerca de las visiones que las
elites nacionales tienen de la pobreza y la desigualdad en sus respectivas
sociedades. Si es verdad que las visiones de los mismos pobres han merecido
la atenci6n de los investigadores saciales, 10 mismo no se puede decir acerca
de como los no-pobres en general y las elites en particular perciben la cuesti6n
de la pobreza. SegUn los autores, esta es una cuesti6n crucial ya que las per-
cepciones cognitivas y normativas de las elites nacionales tienen un fuerte
impacto en la formulaci6n e implementacion de las polfticas sociales y, por 10
tanto, en las condiciones de vida de los pobres.
Information for Contributors
Current Soci%g)" an official journal of the lnternation,ll Sn~iologil\ll Associ-
ation, is one of the oldest and most '''idely cit~J sociology journals in the
world. Prior to 1997, Cun-etlt 50(-10108)' publishl~i long Tr~nd Rt"ports ~\nd
shorter Half Trend Repons on topics of interest to sociologists intl"rn~\tionally.
Examples of recent issues include sociology ot work, r~ltional choice, surVt"
research, social mobility, cancer, leisure, and the inforrllation sOl"ict\".
In 1998 at the Wo;ld Congress of Sociology in Montreal, Cunxnt Soci-
ology was relaunched as a peer-reviewed quarterly, with a focus on shortc."'r
review articles on emergent and challenging so("iologi('~\1 issues in any area of
sociological endeavour. Current Sociolog;v will continul~ to publish ~rrl~nd
Reports but fewer of them to luake roonl for tht.' review articles.
If you would like to propose a Trend Report, please send a detailed prllpos~\l
and a brief curriculum vitae to the Editor. A styIe sheet is av,lilabll" on rcqul"St.
If you submit a shorter review paper, please follow these ~uidl"lincs;
1. Contributions may be submitted in English, Frl'nch or Sp\\nish, but \vill be
published only in English, with extended abstracts in French ilnd Sp~lnish.
Papers will be peer-reviewed by an international panel of sociologists.
2. Contributions are considered for publication only on the undcrstanding
that they are not under consideration for publication elsewhCrl\ and that
they are the original work of the author(s), and that any pr("vious or
current consideration for publication in any other languages Jrc fully dis-
closed. Copyright is signed to the International Sociological Association
on acceptance of any paper for publication in Current Sociology.
3. A guideline for length of papers submitted for peer-review would be
approximately 4000 to 5000 words. Submissions should be typed, double-
spaced throughout, including notes and references, on one side of paper
only with a margin of 3 cm.
4. Three copies should be submitted. Submissions will not norlllally be
returned, so authors should ensure that they keep a copy.
5. Title, author's name, full mailing address, email address and a brief bio-
graphical note should appear on a separate cover sheet.
6. An abstract of 100-200 words and 3-5 keywords should also be provided
on a separate sheet on which the title of the paper appears, but not the
author's name.
7. Figures and tables should be clearly presented and in final copy must be
prepared as camera-ready copy.
8. Notes, if any, should appear at the end of the text.
Editorial Addre. s:
Susan A" McDaniel, Editor (1997-2001), Current Sociology, Department of
Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H4
Phone and Fax: +1(780) 492-0470; Email: cursoc@gpu.srv.ualbcrta.ca
A list of Editorial Board members is provided on the inside front cover.
